DEFINING "RECKLESS DISREGARD" IN
DEFAMATION SUITS: THE ALASKA
SUPREME COURT RENDERS A NARROW
INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW YORK
TIMES RULE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Twenty years ago, in New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan,' the
United States Supreme Court articulated a new standard for assuring the press of its constitutional liberties. Under New York Times,
the press is protected from defamation suits by public officials; a
public official has the burden of proving with convincing clarity that
the publisher acted with knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. 2 The practical limits of the New York Times standard have never been clear, and the Supreme Court has allowed
lower courts considerable liberty in certain areas of interpretation.
One such area is the definition of "reckless disregard for the truth"
as a standard of liability for publishers.
In Green v. Northern Publishing Co.,3 the Supreme Court of
Alaska found that a newspaper publisher was not entitled to summary judgment in a defamation suit because reasonable jurors could
have found reckless disregard for the truth on the publisher's part.
Although the court properly identified the "reckless disregard" test,
its interpretation of the standard ignored significant authority. Further, the structure of the court's analysis served to undermine the
requirements of the New York Times rule. The decision in Green
reflects a narrow view of the guarantees of New York Times, its practical effect is to force publishers to be excessively cautious in their
interpretation and presentation of issues that are inherently
ambiguous.
In 1975, David Selberg, a young pipeline worker, was arrested
for disorderly conduct. Selberg was examined by Dr. Thomas
Green, who was responsible for coordinating all medical services for
the Anchorage correctional facilities. Dr. Green concluded that Selberg was "hallucinating wildly" and recommended that he be
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id at 279-80.
3. 655 P.2d 736 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3539 (1983).
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removed to a hospital for psychiatric examination. Selberg was detained in the cell, however, for nine days, during which time his behavior was completely wild and disoriented - refusing food,
refusing to wear clothes, "throwing himself into the metal slab that
'4
was his bunk, and banging his head and body against the walls."
After nine days in the cell, Selberg died.
According to the autopsy report, Selberg died from the spontaneous collapse of both lungs - a natural cause apparently unrelated
to his incarceration. The lack of a causal connection between Selberg's death and his incarceration precluded the coroner's jury from
finding that anyone could be charged with negligent homicide. Several jurors, however, expressed their conviction, apart from the causation issue, that negligence had occurred on the part of all
concerned - including Dr. Green, who had not taken adequate
steps to assure that his recommendation for the removal of Selberg
5
was followed.
The Anchorage Daily News then commenced a series of articles
which investigated the circumstances surrounding Selberg's death.
This series culminated in an editorial that became the subject of the
defamation action. The editorial claimed that "the state [had] recognized its responsibility for the death of David Paul Selberg. '' 6 The
heart of the alleged defamation was contained in the following two
paragraphs:
Since then, [Health and Social Services] Commissioner Frank
Williamson has taken steps to assure that such a tragedy does not
happen again.
First, he abruptly cancelled the $125,000 a year contract of
the physician serving Anchorage jails for
Dr. Thomas F. Green,
7
the past six years.
Dr. Green brought suit against the owner of the newspaper, alleging defamation. The superior court granted summary judgment
for the defendant. The supreme court reversed and 8remanded for
trial, with one justice concurring and two dissenting.
Justice Burke, writing for the majority, first concluded that the
statement could be found to be defamatory. He wrote that "the editorial [is] susceptible of being reasonably interpreted as meaning that
the Daily News, 'after an extensive investigation,' believed Commissioner Williamson was correct in concluding that Dr. Green was at
least partially responsible for David Selberg's death." 9
4. Id at 738.
5. Id at 746.
6. Id at 738.

7. Id
8. The case is currently awaiting a trial date.
9. Id at 740.
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The court then considered the question of privilege under New
York Times. It ruled that Dr. Green was a "public official," 10 and
therefore, the publisher was entitled to the application of the stringent "actual malice" test. This standard requires that a "public figure" plaintiff show with "convincing clarity" that the defamatory
falsehood was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'"
The Alaska court provided a more detailed definition of the
state of mind which must be proven:
"Reckless disregard," for these purposes, means conduct that is
heedless and shows a wanton indifference to consequences; it is
conduct which is far more than negligent. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the inference that the defendant must
entertainedserious doubts as to the truth
have, in fact, subjectively
12
of his statement.
The court then proceeded to analyze the facts in order to determine whether a reasonable jury could find that the publisher did in
fact entertain serious doubts. The court observed that the publisher
was certainly aware of the autopsy report, which constituted "substantial evidence that Dr. Green was not responsible for Selberg's
death." 3 After considering the evidence available to the publisher
which might have supported the alleged statement, the court
concluded:
It is our determination that the statements from Commissioner
Williamson to [the reporter] are insufficient to conclusively overcome the testimony and coroner's report .... We conclude that
reasonable jurors could disagree as to whether the defendant enDr.
tertained serious doubts about the truth of its assertion that
4
Green was in some way responsible for Selberg's death.1
Justice Compton concurred with the finding that reasonable jurors could disagree about whether the publisher entertained serious
doubts, but disagreed with the majority's treatment of the public figure test. He argued that the court should have applied the "matter of
public interest" test, which had been in use in Alaska since 1967.15
10. Id at 741.
11. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
12. Green, 655 P.2d at 742 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
13. Id at 742.
14. Id at 743-44.
15. Id at 744 (Compton, J., concurring). The majority's treatment of this issue
in Green remains somewhat mysterious. In 1966, the Alaska Supreme Court independently established a "matter of public interest" test to determine the scope of the
New York Times rule. Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711, 713
(Alaska 1966). This decision anticipated by five years the test established by the
United States Supreme Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971) (plurality opinion). However, the United States Supreme Court has since
stepped back from this broad standard. See infra text accompanying notes 31-33.
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Justice, Matthews wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Connor. His first argument was that the court need never have
reached the question of New York Times protection because the editorial was protected under the common law doctrine of fair comment.' 6 The dissent also criticized the majority's holding on the
actual malice question, arguing that "the gist of the defamation" was
in the imputation of negligencein the handling of Selberg's case, not
causation of his death, and there could be no finding of serious
doubt on the question of negligence. 17 Observing that the editorial
had reported that the coroner had found death by natural causes, the
dissent argued that to hold the publisher liable for implying that the
coroner may have been wrong would effectively create a duty to accept the coroner's opinion even where reason to doubt might exist. 8
Finally, noting that the Daily News's series on the Selberg affair "was
in keeping with those values [of responsible journalism] designed to
be secured under the constitutional guarantees" provided by New
York Times, the dissent concluded that "[a]s applied by the majority
in the present case, however, the protection offered by the Times rule
is so weak as to be illusory."' 9
The purpose of this note is to examine the Green decision
against the background of recent developments in the definition of
"reckless disregard." Although there is strong evidence of a general
trend toward narrowing the scope of protection afforded to the press
under New York Times, particularly in the definition of public
figures,20 this trend is not evident in the definition of reckless disregard. The note discusses the United States Supreme Court cases St. Amant v. Thompson,21 Time, Inc. v. Pape,22 and Bose Corp. v.
Justice Compton argued, "[w]hile the Supreme Court has come full circle, Pearson
stands on its own, needing support from neither New York Times nor Rosenbloom.
It is the law in this state. . . ." Green, 655 P.2d at 744 (Compton, J., concurring).
Pearsonwas held to still represent Alaska law in Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12,
16 (D. Alaska 1979). Strangely, though, the Green majority made no mention whatsoever of Pearson,leaving doubts whether its use of the narrower "public official"
test should be interpreted as a repudiation of the "matter of public interest" test in
Alaska.
16. Green, 655 P.2d at 745 (Matthews, J., dissenting). A discussion of the merits
of this argument is beyond the scope of this note. For a thorough treatment of this
possibility, see Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Neglected Fair Comment
Defense: An Alternative to "ActualMalice,"30 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1980).
17. Green, 655 P.2d at 745 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
18. Id at 747 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
19. Id at 748 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
20. See, eg., Carman, supra note 16, at 6-7; Kulzick & Hogue, Chilled Bird"
Freedom ofExpression in the Eighties, 14 Loy. L.A.L. Rnv. 57 (1980); Rosen, Media
Lament - The Rise and Fall of Involuntary Public Figures,54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
487 (1980).
21. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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Consumers Union, Inc. 23 - which most directly control the issue in
Green. In addition, the note considers recent cases decided in both
federal and state jurisdictions which construe the reckless disregard
standard.
Finally, two major criticisms of the Green opinion are suggested.
First, the court either should have followed or explicitly distinguished the facts of Pape. Second, in view of the ambiguities inherent in the facts of Green - ambiguities concerning what the editors
intended to say as well as concerning what the editors knew - the
structure of the court's analysis was flawed and served to undermine
the fundamental requirements of the New York Times rule. Although the decision in Green was not clearly contrary to authority,
neither was it well-supported. Thus, it indicates that the Alaska
Supreme Court may have a tendency to interpret narrowly the protections of New York Times.
II.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW YopK TIMES RULE IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Generally

When the rule of New York Times was announced in 1964, proponents of strong First Amendment protections greeted it as "an occasion for dancing in the streets."' 24 The Supreme Court had found
that special protection was required for the press in order to preserve
the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials. '2 5
Since 1964, the rule has undergone a great deal of refinement
and clarification. For several years, the attitude of the Court was
26
expansive. For example, in Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, it
was established that a mere failure to investigate cannot constitute
reckless disregard for the truth. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 27 the
Court ruled that the actual malice test must be a subjective one;
therefore, the question is not what the defendant should have
28
thought but only what he actually thought.
22. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
23. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).

24. A. Meiklejohn, quoted in Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on
"The CentralMeaning ofthe FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125.

25. New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
26. 389 U.S. 81, 84-85 (1967).
27. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).

28. Id at 731.
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The Supreme Court decisions of 1971 are generally acknowledged to be the high-water mark of protection under the New York
Times rule.29 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.30 the Court expanded the protection of the rule to include any statement involving
a matter of public interest, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a
public official.
31
The Rosenbloom court, however, was a sharply divided one,
and after that decision the Court began narrowing the scope of protection. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,3 2 the Court explicitly repudiated Rosenbloom and announced a "public figure" test to replace the
broader "public interest" test. The Court has been relatively active
33
in defining the limits of the public figure test.
34
Recently, in Herbert v. Lando, the Court made it easier for
plaintiffs to gather evidence of actual malice by opening the editorial
processes of publishers to discovery. Lando and other recent decisions have triggered a widespread recognition among commentators
that New York Times protection has been on the wane for several
35
years.
This cursory survey of the New York Times rule is meant only to
illustrate the existence of a recent trend toward restricting the protection provided defamation defendants. 36 Regardless of any trends
which may have developed over the past decade, however, the fundamental rationale of New York Times has never been challenged.
In Lando and Gertz, two landmarks of the current trend, the Court
has taken pains to indicate that the doctrine of New York Times remains vital. The Court in Lando observed that the doctrine "has
been repeatedly affirmed" and was being reaffirmed in the instant
case. 37 The Court in Gertz, perhaps to soften the blow of its holding,
stressed that the primary purpose of the New York Times rule prevention of media self-censorship - was still being served:
This standard administers an extremely powerful antidote to the
inducement to media self-censorship ....
And it exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood.
29. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.

265 (1971).
30. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion).

31. Id at 52.
32. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
33. See generally Note, Woston andHutchinson: Changing Contours ofthe Public Figure Test, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 179 (1979).
34. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
35. See supra note 20.
36. For a thorough history of the New York Times rule, see Annot., 61 L. Ed. 2d
975 (complete through October 1982).
37. Lando, 441 U.S. at 169.
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Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally
subjected to injury, will
be unable to surmount the barrier of the
38

New York Times test.

• . . [T]he communications media are entitled to act on the
assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defama39
tory falsehood concerning them.

B.

Defining Reckless Disregard

1. St.Amant v. Thompson:.A Showing of Subjective Faultis Re40
quired It is well established that "mere negligence is not enough"
to create liability for publishers under the New York Times rule. As
the Supreme Court explained in St. Amant v. Thompson:
[The] cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or
would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in4 1fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.
The Court in St. Amant went on to offer suggestions as to how
"serious doubts" might be defined. Since the standard is a subjective
one, and the publisher is expected to testify as to his own good faith,
the plaintiff is compelled to show circumstances from which a jury
could infer that serious doubt did exist.
Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for
example, where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the
publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a
reckless man would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.42
Thus, the phrases "inherently improbable" and "obvious reasons to doubt" provide guidance in determining whether defendantpublishers had serious doubts as to the truth of their statements.
These guidelines are of some use, but their practical significance was
not made clear in St. Amant. The Court recognized this and admitted that it had not exhausted the subject: "'Reckless disregard,' it is
true, cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-by-case
adjudication .
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

. .43

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
Id at 345.
Green, 655 P.2d at 741.
St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 (quoted in Green, 655 P.2d at 741).
St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732 (citation omitted).
Id at 730.
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The task of defining "serious doubt," then, is a fact-specific one.
The case-by-case method is not an ideal way of providing security
under a constitutional guarantee, particularly where the standard is
meant to prevent self-censorship by editors unsure of their legal
grounds. 44 Furthermore, Supreme Court supervision of the serious
doubt/reckless disregard standard after St. Amant has been minimal. 45 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Pape addressed the issue in a factual situation similar to that of Green.
2. Time, Inc. v. Pape. Rational Interpretationsof Ambiguous
Sources Cannot Constitute Reckless Disregard In Time, Inc. v.
Pae 46 the Supreme Court faced the issue whether a publisher has
entertained serious doubts when he has deliberately published his
own interpretation of an ambiguous factual situation. Time magazine ran a story concerning a report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights. The report discussed allegations of police
brutality. Although the editors of Time magazine admittedly knew
that the reports of brutality were only alleged, they nevertheless
characterized the reports asfindingsof the Commission, simply omitting the word "alleged." 47 The question, then, was not whether Time
magazine had made an unwitting mistake.
Time made no claim of good-faith error or mere negligence. Both the author of the article and the researcher admitted
an awareness at the time of publication that the wording of the
Commission Report had been significantly 4 altered,
but insisted
8
that its real meaning had not been changed.
The question was the extent to which a publisher may stamp a situation with his own interpretation and present it as fact. The court of
appeals, in reversing a directed verdict for Time magazine, concluded that "[s]ince the omission was admittedly conscious and deliberate," an issue of material fact must have existed as to whether
the publisher entertained serious doubts. 4 9 The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the directed verdict by ruling that no material issue of fact could exist on the question of actual malice.
The Court's reasoning was grounded in the observation that
publishers are often confronted with complex factual situations
which are rendered even more ambiguous by the comments of their
sources. "A press report of what someone has said about an underlying event of news value can contain an almost infinite variety of
shadings.. . . [W]here the source itself has engaged in qualifying
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
See infra note 62.
401 U.S. 279 (1971).
Id at 281-83.
Id at 285.
Id
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the information released, complexities ramify. 50° The press cannot
be required to report every angle of a complex issue, and it cannot be
expected to ascertain the most accurate conclusion. Thus, publishers
must be granted the discretion to choose one among many plausible
interpretations. The Court concluded in Pape that:
Time's omission of the word "alleged" amounted to the adoption of one of a number of possible rational interpretations of a
document that bristled with ambiguities. The deliberate choice of
such an interpretation, though arguably reflecting a misconception, was not5 enough to create a jury issue of "malice" under New
York Times. '

The decision in Papesubstantially qualified what the St. Amant
court meant by "obvious reasons to doubt" and "fabrication." The
publisher was in a position of uncertainty as to what his source actually meant to say, but he was entitled to present his own interpretation as fact. The official document "bristled with ambiguities."
Although the document never went beyond the term "allegations," it
was written in such a way that one easily could have concluded that
the allegations of brutality were true.52 Time magazine, in reporting
them as true, was within the protected range of editorial discretion
even though it could easily be claimed that reasons to doubt the assertion did exist.
Clearly, the holding of Pape is highly relevant to the issue in
Green. In each case, the publisher encountered a factual situation
which was unclear and was then sued for presenting his own interpretation of the situation. If Pape is read broadly, it can be seen as
announcing a rule that any interpretation by the press of ambiguous
circumstances will be protected so long as the interpretation has
some rational basis.
On the other hand, it is not clear that Pape should be read as
announcing a broad rule. The Pape court was careful to point out
that its decision was a fact-specific one;5 3 thus, it might be unwise to

follow Pape very far beyond its own facts. Also, at the time of the
Green decision, it was possible to question the continued vitality of
Pape, in light of the recent trend of retrenchment.54 Pape was decided during the same year as Rosenbloom, which has since been
discredited. It could have been argued that Pape,like Rosenbloom,
was a product of an overly protective Court and, as such, should be
read narrowly.
50. Id at 286.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id at 290.
Id at 286-89.
Id. at 292.
See supra note 20.
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In the Court's first significant actual malice case in thirteen

years, Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union, Inc.,5 however, the

Supreme Court reaffirmed the authority of Pape by citing that decision twice. In Bose, a consumer magazine was sued for reporting
that a stereo speaker system seemed to make the sounds of musical
instruments wander "about the room." Judgment for the plaintiffstereo company was entered by the trial court. On appeal, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the
facts and reversed on the grounds that there was no clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.5 6
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
holding.5 7 The Court thoroughly reviewed the actual malice finding
by the trial court in Bose and concluded that there was no clear and
convincing evidence of reckless disregard by the consumer
58
magazine.
In Bose, the defendant-reporter made an inaccurate statement
in reporting his own perceptions, and at trial he attempted to stand
by the accuracy of the statements, refusing to admit that he had been
mistaken. The trial court found that since the defendant knew what
he had heard, but reported something else, he must have entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his statements. 59 The Supreme
Court held, however, that because the perceived event was ambiguous and required interpretation, no reckless disregard existed because the language chosen by the defendant "was 'one of a number
of possible rational interpretations' of an event 'that bristled with
ambiguities'....-60
Thus, Bose significantly bolsters the strength of the holding of
Pape. The facts of Bose and Papeare easily distinguishable, 61yet the
Supreme Court chose to cite Pape specifically, rather than simply
citing the general definition of serious doubt articulated in St.
Amant.
55. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
56. Id at 1955.
57. Six justices forr.-d the majority.
58. Id at 1966. The primary issue decided by the Court was whether appellate
courts must apply a "clearly erroneous" standard in reviewing lower court findings
on actual malice. See infra note 95.
59. 104 S.Ct. at 1966.
60. Id (quoting Pape,401 U.S. at 290).
61. In Pape,the source of the story was an official document, while in Bose it
was the reporter's own senses. The common thread found by the Court was that
neither of these were "events that spoke for themselves." Id
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III.

CASE DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO BOSE

With the exception of Bose, the reckless disregard standard has
faced little Supreme Court review since Pape.62 Bose had not been
decided at the time of the Green decision. A survey of recent cases
decided before Bose reveals an inconsistent application of Pape.63 In
general, it is safe to say that the trend toward favoring plaintiffs is
not being followed on actual malice questions to the extent that it is
being followed on public figure questions. 64
In Rebozo v. Washington Post Co. 65 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed a case concerning a Washington Post story based
on the alleged financial misdeeds of Charles G. "Bebe" Rebozo.
The Post reporter was aware a private investigator working for E.F.
Hutton had stated in a deposition that he told Rebozo that certain
stocks had been stolen or were missing. This point was crucial in
62. The only notable case which has received Supreme Court review is Cantrell
v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). The Court held that actual malice could be found to exist because a reporter wrote about an interview which he
later acknowledged had not occurred. The facts of Cantrellaretoo dissimilar from
Pape and Green to allow a useful comparison.
63. Most of the cases which involve the definition of serious doubt turn on the
reliabilityof the publishers' sources of information, without concern for the complicating factor of contradictory or ambiguous sources. The most that could be concluded from a survey of these cases is that there is no obvious trend in favor of
either plaintiffs or defendants.
Defendants who have argued appeals in the federal circuits have actually fared
rather well, but little can be concluded from such a cursory survey. See Schultz v.
Newsweek, Inc., 668 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming summary judgment for defendant); Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing verdict for plaintiff); Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cer. denied,
452 U.S. 962 (1981) (reversing verdict for plaintiff); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3rd Cir. 1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant);
Long v. Arcell, 618 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981)
(affirming judgment n.o.v. for defendant). But see Golden Bear Distrib. Sys., Inc. v.
Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1233 (1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff).
High courts in the states have exhibited no discernible trend. See, e.g., Mehau
v. Gannet Pac. Corp., 658 P.2d 312 (Hawaii 1983) (affirming in part and reversing in
part summary judgments); Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350
(1980), cert. denied,451 U.S. 911 (1981) (affirming summary judgment for newspaper reporter); Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 445 A.2d
1038 (1982), cert. denied,459 U.S. 989 (1982) (upholding directed verdict for defendant); Independent Broadcasting Corp. v. Hernstadt, 664 P.2d 337 (Nevada 1983)
(affirming verdict for plaintiff); Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 422, 420
N.E.2d 377, 438 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1981) (denying summary judgment to defendant);
Bukky v. Painesville Tel. & Lake Geauga Printing Co., 68 Ohio St. 2d 45, 428
N.E.2d 405 (1981) (upholding summary judgment for defendant).
64. See supra note 63.
65. 637 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,454 U.S. 964 (1981).
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supporting the allegations; however, upon interviewing the investigator, the reporter never questioned him about the statement in the
deposition. The court ruled that the "[defendant's] resolution of the
obvious ambiguity

. . .

in favor of the most potentially damaging

alternative creates a jury question on whether the publication was
indeed made without serious doubt as to its truthfulness. '66 The
question for the jury was whether the reporter had intentionally
failed to ask the question so that he could make "a front-page story
of an episode which otherwise might not have commanded any significant attention, when taken in a light most favorable to [the
plaintiff]. 67
The point of Rebozo is clear. Where ambiguity exists within the
facts underlying a story, the publisher may not intentionally abuse
this uncertainty by choosing the most damaging interpretation,
which, by implication, is the interpretation which he most desires to
68
publish.
The Colorado Supreme Court has taken an even tougher stance
on the press' freedom to interpret facts. In Burns v. McGraw-Hill
BroadcastingCo.,69 the court considered a case involving a newspaper article about a bomb squad officer who had been severely injured in an explosion. The story reported that "his wife and five
children have deserted him since the accident. ' 70 The ex-wife sued,
claiming that the use of the word "deserted" in this context defamed
her. In fact, the couple had experienced marital problems prior to
the accident, and the reporter was aware that the wife had reasons
for leaving her husband which were not related to the accident. On
the other hand, in discussing the events which followed his accident,
the officer had told the reporter, "I know what it's like to be deserted. ' 71 On these facts, the state court upheld a finding of actual
malice.
These two cases illustrate that some courts have attached little
weight to the Papedecision. 72 In each, it was held that actual malice
could be found to exist because the publisher's interpretation was a
66. Id at 382 (citing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731).
67. Rebozo, 637 F.2d at 382.

68. Actually, although the ultimate point of Rebozo is clear, the Court's analysis
suggests that the reporter's failure to ask certain questions was also important. If the
Rebozo court had based its holding on this point, it would have run afoul of the rule
of Beckley Newspapers,which states that a mere failure to investigate cannot constitute reckless disregard for the truth. See supra text accompanying note 26.
69. 659 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1983) (en bane with five dissenters).
70. I at 1354.
71. Id at 1363.
72. Neither case addressed Pape.
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defamatory one. Three other recent cases, however, serve to support
a broad reading of Pape.
In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.,73 the District Court for
the District of Columbia expressly declined to follow Rebozo and
endorsed Pape. The Washington Postpublished a story which stated
that an executive of Mobil Oil had used his influence improperly in
order to set up his son in the shipping business. In composing the
article, the reporter ignored certain comments of a Mobil director
which tended to disprove the story. Thus, the court faced the question whether actual malice can exist when the publisher intentionally
disregards information which might change the story. In affirming
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendants, the court
declared: "The issue in this case is . . . not whether the article was
partisan, narrow, or one-sided. ' 74 Rather, the issue was whether the
ignored information would have removed the ambiguity of the underlying facts, and thus removed the element of interpretation from
the editor's task. If the information demonstrated that the article
was false, then actual malice could be found to exist. But where the
information merely supported a contrary interpretation, where it
would have shaded the story in a different direction, then there could
be no reckless disregard in ignoring it. 75 In its discussion of authorities, the court found that Rebozo is "arguably inconsistent" with
Pape, and refused to follow Rebozo "[i]n the absence of any further
' 76
guidance on the issue from this Circuit or the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also has followed Pape in a
recent decision. In Lawrence v. BauerPublishing& PrintingLtd, 7 7 a
newspaper reported that a citizens' group was being investigated for
forgery of names on petitions. The story reported the names of two
of the group's leaders. The source for the story was a city official
who had told the publishers that there were "irregularities" being
investigated, without naming the plaintiffs in particular. The reporter named the plaintiffs simply because their names were commonly associated with the leadership of the group. The court
reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiffs and stated that although the
story was "careless and perhaps irresponsible, '78 the publisher, nevertheless, was protected under the New York Times rule. Citing
Pape,the court stated that "[n]either 'errors of interpretation ofjudgment' nor 'misconceptions' are sufficient to create a jury issue of
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983).
Id. at 658.
Id at 657.
Id at 658.
89 N.J. 451, 446 A.2d 469 (1982), cert. denied,459 U.S. 999 (1982).
Id at 468, 446 A.2d at 478.
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actual malice . . . . 79 The court voiced its opinion that the definition of reckless disregard does not extend to questions of interpretation. "ITihe recklessness in publishing material of obviously
doubtful veracity must approach the level of publishing a 'knowing,
calculated falsehood.'

"80

Without mentioning Pape, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
recently affirmed summary judgment for defendants in a case which
presented an issue similar to that in Tavoulareas. In Curran v. PhiladeiphiaNewspapers, Inc.,81 a newspaper, in reporting the resignation
of a United States Attorney, stated that he had resigned involuntarily and otherwise would have been fired the next day in a meeting
with his superior. The story was based on information from a reliable source who did not mention the meeting, but stated that the
plaintiff would have been fired had he not resigned. The plaintiff
and his assistant had both denied the story, and they had presented
evidence to the reporter that the meeting was a regularly-scheduled
meeting on a mundane administrative topic. The assistant of the
plaintiffs superior declined to comment. In affirming summary
judgment for the newspaper, the court ruled that, despite the presence of information suggesting other interpretations, the publisher's
reliance
on a reliable source precluded any finding of actual malice.82 "[I]t simply cannot be concluded that a defendant entertained
the requisite doubt as to the veracity of the challenged publication
where the publication was based on information a defendant could
reasonably believe to be accurate."8 3 The court's statement that
"reasonable belief' is a defense to a charge of "serious doubt" is
similar to the Pape court's use of the phrase "possible rational
interpretations."
IV. ANALYSIS
The opinion in Green is subject to two major lines of criticism.
First, if the crucial issue is the one recognized by the court - that is,
whether the authors entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
assertion that Dr. Green somehow may have caused Selberg's death,
then Pape should have controlled the Green decision. Second, by
separating the question of whether the defendant's statement can be
construed as defamatory from the question of actual malice, the
court opened a loophole in the subjectivity requirement of the New
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id at 468, 446 A.2d at 477.
Id at 466, 446 A.2d at 477.
497 Pa. 163, 439 A.2d 652 (1981).
Id at 181, 439 A.2d at 661.
Id at 180, 439 A.2d at 660 (emphasis added).
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York Times rule. In effect, the court made it possible for publishers
to be held liable for a merely negligent misstatement.
A. Pape Can Be Dispositive of the Issue in Green 84
The facts of Green must be examined more closely. If the
sources of information for the editorial were unclear enough to make
interpretation necessary, and the statements at issue represented a
reasonable interpretation, then the Green court should either have
85
followed or distinguished Pape.
The primary fact is that the authors were aware of the coroner's
conclusion that Selberg had died of natural causes unrelated to his
incarceration. However, the authors also possessed evidence from
three different sources which tended to cloud the picture. The written comments of the jurors from the coroner's inquest, as well as
some comments from both Dr. Green and his ultimate superior, gave
rise to doubts as to the certainty of the coroner's conclusion.
Although the coroner's jury did not hand down any charges,
three of the jurors entered comments into the record expressing their
doubts and frustration. They found that some negligence had certainly occurred, but that the evidence of causation was insufficient to
support a charge of negligent homicide against any one person. The
jurors were not convinced, however, that there was no possibility of
such a causal connection.8 6 One stated, "[a]lthough I could find no
one person guilty of negligent homicide. . . I do strongly feel that
there was negligence perpetrated on him in life."'8 7 Another stated,
"there are questions left unanswered because we do not know what
' 88
causes spontaneous collapse of both lungs."
Dr. Green himself, acknowledging that chest problems are not
his specialty, had speculated in an interview that Selberg's behavior
in the cell may have aggravated a pre-existing condition.8 9 Of more
importance are the comments of Commissioner Williamson, which
the Green majority recognized as "[t]he defendant's best hope of
avoiding [a finding of] recklessness." 90 The Commissioner's comments implied a lack of confidence in the coroner's report: "We are
all guilty. . . . I think we can stop it from happening again. . . . If
anyone along the way had made another decision, Selberg would
84. For purposes of this discussion it will be assumed that the editorial does
contain an assertion that some causal link may have existed between Dr. Green's
conduct and Selberg's death.
85. The court in Green made no mention whatsoever of Pape.
86. Green v. Northern Publishing Co., 655 P.2d at 746.

87. Id
88. Id.

89. Id at 747.
90. Id at 742.
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still be alive." 91 Elsewhere, the Commissioner expressed his special
concern about Dr. Green's role: "I have trouble with all of it...
'92
[e]specially the medical end."
In the court's analysis, the coroner's report created a presumption that the editors seriously doubted their statements, and the defendant failed to rebut the presumption: "It is our determination that
the statements from Commissioner Williamson. . .are insufficient
93
to conclusively overcome the testimony and coroner's report."
This approach seems to be inconsistent with the guidelines of
St. Amant and Pape. There is nothing inherently implausible in the
assertion that Selberg's death may have been related to his incarceration, considering that the death occurred after nine days of fasting
and self-abuse. Obviously, the coroner's conclusion created reasons
to doubt the editors' assertion; however, these are not the "obvious
reasons to doubt" required by the constitutional guarantees. The
holding in Pape controls unclear cases like Green where reasons to
doubt would exist for any assertion, and some element of interpretation by the press is required. The point of Papeis that editors must
not be required to choose the best
interpretation; it is sufficient that
94
their interpretations be rational.
If the Green court had followed Pape,it would have reversed its
presumptions; the editors' interpretation would have been presumed
to be adequate, unless the editors were shown to have possessed evidence so compelling that it removed the rational grounds from the
published assertion. The question in Green, then, would not be
whether the other sources were sufficient to "conclusively overcome"
the influence of the coroner's report. Rather, the question would be
whether the coroner's report was conclusive enough to remove the
rational grounds from the writers' suspicions that there may have
been some causal connection between the incarceration and the
death.
Under Pape,the facts of Green should lead to summary judgment. 95 Reasonable jurors certainly could disagree whether the
Daily News's assertion was wise or well-supported by the available
sources. However, it is difficult to imagine a reasonable juror finding
91. Id at 742-43.
92. Id at 743.
93. Id
94. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
95. The propriety of granting summary judgment in actual malice cases has
been a subject of dispute. It has been argued that the constitutional guarantees of
the New York Times rule require independent action by judges. See, e.g., Bon Air
Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 867 (5th Cir. 1970). On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has stated in a footnote that the "proof of 'actual malice' calls a
defendant's state of mind into question, and does not readily lend itself to summary
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that, in spite of the other comments and the uncertainty of the situation, there was no rational basis for suspecting that the coroner's
96
conclusion may have been wrong.
This is not to say that the court had to rule that Pape was dispositive of Green. As noted previously, the Supreme Court warned
97
that Pape was fact-specific and should not be read too broadly.
The facts of Green can be distinguished from those of Pape. The

official document at issue in Papelent itself very easily to the conclu-

sion that the alleged incidents had occurred.98 In contrast, the

weight of the evidence in Green seemed to support a probability
(though not a certainty) that Selberg's death was indeed unrelated to

his incarceration.
Therefore, while strong reasons existed for following Pape,there
were also grounds for distinguishing the case. While the Green court
could have followed Pape, it was not strictly bound to do so. In
ignoring Pape altogether, the court has aligned itself with the current
trend toward the weakening of New York Times protection.
disposition." Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (citations omitted).
The decision in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984),
lends strong support to those who favor the propriety of summary judgment. In
holding that appellate courts may conduct de novo reviews of the evidence, the
Court effectively dismissed the argument that evaluation of witnesses' credibility is
essential to actual malice cases. This is clearly shown by the fact that the dissenting
opinion of Justice Rehnquist reiterated the logic of footnote nine in Proxmire,stating that appellate courts are ill-equipped to evaluate issues involving mens rea.Bose,
id at 1960 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
While the holding of Bose supports summary judgment, the language of Bose
goes even further. The Court did not use guarded language, but rather made it very
clear that judges should operate independently of triers of fact in analyzing actual
malice cases:
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New
York Times v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged
from the exigency of deciding concrete cases; it is law in its purest form
under our common law heritage. It reflects a deeply held conviction that
judges - and particularly members of this Court - must exercise such
review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained
by the Constitution. The question whether the evidence in the record in a
defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance
of First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier of
fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide
whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional
threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear
and convincing proof of "actual malice."
Id at 1965.
96. As the dissent noted, the coroner's report was in itself only an opinion.
Green, 655 P.2d at 747 n.2.
97. See supra text accompanying note 53.
98. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. at 288.
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The Structure of the Opinion

The court's analysis of the constitutional issue in Green was
performed entirely apart from the threshold issue of how the statements in the editorial should be construed. The court stated:
We have already determined that reasonable jurors could find that
the Daily News stated that Dr. Green was at least partially responsible for David Selberg's death. The question then, is
whether this statement was made with knowledge or at least with
serious doubt as to its truth. 99
This separation of the issues resulted in two very different standards being employed. On the question of how to construe the editorial statement, a simple reasonableness test was applied, and it was
found that reasonable jurors could interpret the editorial as an assertion of Dr. Green's causal responsibility for Selberg's death. Only
upon passing to the question of whether the editors entertained serious doubt did the court apply the much stricter standards of the New
York Times rule.
This approach serves to simplify the constitutional analysis.
The question of what was said is settled first. Then the question
whether the statement was seriously doubted by the author may be
analyzed without confronting the complicated question whether the
statement at issue actually was intended to be understood in such a
manner. This two-tiered analysis is the typical method for approaching such cases. 1°° As a method for assuring the guarantees of
New York Times, however, it is badly flawed. The problem with this
two-tiered method is that it applies too liberal a standard to the important question of how the authors intended the publication to be
interpreted. The question of the way in which the statement can be
construed must not be separated from the issue whether the publisher entertained serious doubts as to its truth; for it is simply nonsensical to speak of an author "in fact entertaining serious doubts"
99. Green, 655 P.2d at 742.
100. "[I]f the language used is capable of two interpretations, one of which would
be defamatory and the other not, then it is for the jury to determine which meaning
would be given the words by those who read them." Fairbanks Publishing Co. v.
Pitka, 376 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska 1962) (footnote omitted). In some states, the question is not for the jury but for the court. See, e.g., Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp.
1364, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying New Jersey law); Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying New York law).
Illinois is the most protective state; there the court seeks an "innocent construction"
of the statement "by reading the language stripped of innuendo." Cantrell v. American Broadcast Co., 529 F. Supp. 746, 755 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (citations omitted). In
none of these cases, however, is there an explicit suggestion that constitutional issues
may influence the construction question.
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about a statement's truth unless he was aware of how the statement
would be construed. 1 1
Thus, the two-tiered analysis opens the possibility of publishers
being held liable for statements they did not intend to make. To find
that a published statement could be interpreted as a defamatory assertion, and then to impose liability because the author possessed
evidence of that assertion's falsity, is in effect to rule that the author
should have known that the publication would be so interpreted.
and this is
Thus, the publisher is held liable for mere negligence,
02

dearly proscribed by the New York Times rule.1

This faulty method of analysis could be cured by applying the

subjectivity and clarity requirements of St. Amant directly to the

construction question. 0 3 The plaintiff should have to prove with

101. This conclusion is simply a logical observation. Its purpose is to point out
the incompatibility of objective and subjective standards, or at least the difficulty of
applying them simultaneously. If the law requires that the defendant must have
subjectively doubted the truth of an assertion, then it is insufficient to find that his
utterance could be construed as that assertion, for this provides no guarantee that
the defendant in fact contemplated that particular implication of his utterance. And
one cannot doubt what one has not contemplated.
This problem has been receiving attention recently in the related field of "libel
by fiction." See, e.g., Wilson, The Law of Libel and the Art of Fiction, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 28 (1981); Comment, Defamation in Fiction: With Malice TowardNone andPunitive Damagesfor All, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 99, 128 (1983).
102. See supra text accompanying note 28; Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159
(1979) ("[T1o avoid self-censorship it was essential that liability for damages be conditioned on the specified showing of culpable conduct."); see also Green, 655 P.2d at
742, which states: "[Reckless disregard] is conduct which is far more than
negligent."
103. As noted above, sufpra note 100, courts have not explicitly applied the subjectivity and clarity requirements of St. Amant directly to the construction question.
However, there have been indications of courts' willingness to find innocent constructions in cases where New York Times would apply. In Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1969), the Court ruled as a matter of law that
the word "blackmail" was used innocently at a public debate. The Court did not
discuss the standard used in this determination. However, the significance of the
holding may have been indicated in Justice White's concurring opinion, in which he
charged that the holding serves "to immunize professional communicators from liability for their use of ambiguous language." Id at 23 (White, J., concurring). In
Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the
district court stopped short of explicitly applying New York Times requirements to
the construction question; however, the facts indicate that the court was very willing
to find innocent constructions wherever possible. For example, in an article about
the plaintiff which was highly charged with negative criticism, the statement that the
plaintiffs legal career abruptly ended when he "failed to make it through Harvard
Law School" was found not to imply that he had failed for academic reasons. Id at
90. Unlike the court in Green, the court in Loeb does not seem to have been asking
whether the statement could reasonably be read that way; for clearly it could.
Rather, the court seems to have been looking for clear and convincing evidence that
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convincing clarity that the defamatory meaning was actually contemplated by the author. In order to determine this, the court would
have to consider the variety of interpretations to which the publication was susceptible. If there were other interpretations that could
reasonably reflect the intentions of the author, it would be difficult to
show with convincing clarity that the author contemplated the defamatory implication.
This analysis supports the dissenting opinion in Green. It is
clear that the editorial implied responsibility on Dr. Green's part. It
is equally clear that no serious doubt in the minds of the editors
could be found as to an assertion of mere negligence on Dr. Green's
part. What is unclear is whether the implications of responsibility
constituted assertions of a causal connection between Dr. Green's
negligence and Selberg's death. The majority opinion used the terms
"responsibility," "fault," and "cause" interchangeably. 10 4 The dissent, on the other hand, argued that "the gist of the defamation lies
in the imputation of neglect to Dr. Green."' 05 The crucial question
was whether the editorial could be found with convincing clarity to
have implied that Dr. Green may have causedthe death, or whether
it merely implied that Dr. Green's negligence rendered him "responsible" in the sense that he might have been found criminally liable,
given stronger evidence of causation.
The majority did not directly address this question. Although
the court ruled that some implication of a causal connection between
Dr. Green's inaction and Selberg's death could be found by jurors,
the standardthat was used for determining a defamatory intent remains unclear. If it were merely reasonableto interpret the editorial
in its most damaging light, then the holding is objectionable. Only if
it were clear that such a defamatory meaning was contemplated by
the author would the court's holding satisfy the subjective test of the
New York Times rule. The Green court twice used the word "clear"
to describe the editorial's defamatory statements. 0 6 However, the
standard that was explicitly employed was not one of "convincing
clarity." The explicit holding in Green was that it was reasonableto
construe the editorial in a defamatory light. 0 7
the statement was intended to be so interpreted: "[T]he ambiguity cannot be
stretched to convey a meaning not expressed." Id
For cases involving the protection of imprecise language, see Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 197 (1st Cir. 1982), a 'd, 104 S. Ct. 1949
(1984); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 443 U.S. 157 (1978).
104. Green, 655 P.2d at 739-40.
105. Id at 745 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
106. Id at 739.
107. Id at 740.

1984]

RECKLESS DISREGARD
V.

CONCLUSION

The significance of the Green decision is best appreciated when
one understands the unavoidable tension that resides within the law
of defamation. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he rule of New
York Times was based on a recognition that the First Amendment

guarantee of a free press is inevitably in tension with state libel laws
designed to secure society's interest in the protection of individual

reputation." 10 8 The reason for this dilemma is that laws which guar-

antee freedom do little to discourage irresponsibility; policymakers
have never been able to avoid this difficulty.10 9
In America, the task of regulating this tension has been entrusted in part to the courts. Concerning the particular problem of
defining reckless disregard, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated
that the issue lends itself to imprecision and must be considered one
case at a time. 110 Thus, the role of the individual state courts attains
importance. Each court has considerable liberty in deciding cases on

the merits; however, each court also bears a responsibility to interpret the guidelines of the Supreme Court as accurately as possible.

With its decision in Green, the Alaska Supreme Court has exhibited a tendency to favor the protection of individual reputations

over the interest in an uninhibited press. As this note has attempted
to show, it is arguable whether the court strayed impermissibly be-

yond the guidelines established by the Supreme Court. What is clear
is that a contrary decision in Green would have been well within

those guidelines.
Publishers in Alaska, and their attorneys, should take full note

of the Green decision."1

Green puts publishers on notice that they

108. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 270 (1971).
109. Among those principles deemed sacred in America, among those sacred rights considered as forming the bulwark of their liberty, which the
Government contemplates with awful reverence and would approach only
with the most cautious circumspection, there is no one of which the importance is more deeply impressed on the public mind than the liberty of the
press. That this liberty is often carried to excess; that it has sometimes degenerated into licentiousness,is seen and lamented, but the remedy has not
yet been discovered Perhaps it is an evil inseparablefrom the good with
which it is allied;perhapsit is a shoot which cannot be stripedfrom the stalk
without wounding vitally theplantfrom which it is torn. However desirable
those measures might be which might correct without enslaving thepress,they
have never yet been devised in America.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Corp., 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971) (quoting 6 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at 336 (G. Hunt ed. 1906)) (emphasis in original).
110. See supra text accompanying note 43.
111. Green may represent a change in the attitude of the Alaska Supreme Court
toward publishers' privilege. Although the issue of reckless disregard had not been
addressed by the Alaska Supreme Court before Green, the court in the past has
displayed a tendency toward an attitude protective of the press. See, e.g., Urethane
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will be responsible for the clarity of their statements, even if the underlying factual situations are rife with ambiguity. After Green, publishers who attempt to draw their own conclusions from ambiguous
grounds will face the possibility of drawing liability upon
themselves.
Andrew B. Stegemoeller

Specialties, Inc. v. Valdez, 620 P.2d 683 (Alaska 1980); West v. Northern Publishing
Co., 487 P.2d 1304 (Alaska 1971); Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d
711 (Alaska 1966).

